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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers the period from June 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017.1 The
Article discusses attorney discipline, ineffective assistance of counsel,
legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, disqualification, judicial
ethics, several miscellaneous cases involving legal ethics, opinions of the
Formal Advisory Opinion Board, and amendments to the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct.
II. LAWYER DISCIPLINE

2

A. Disbarments,
1. Trust Account Violation
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred one attorney during the survey
period for mishandling funds in his trust account. 4 The lawyer collected
over $113,000 from a buyer at a real estate closing but did not disburse
the funds to the seller until the seller filed a lawsuit to collect the funds.
*William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Mercer University School of Law. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of Sussex
(M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Texas.
1. For an analysis of legal ethics during the prior survey period, see Patrick Emery
Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 68 MERCER L. REV. 167 (2016).
2. In addition to the matters recited in the text, the Investigative Panel of the State
Disciplinary Board imposed confidential discipline in the form of Formal Letters of
Admonition in twenty-four cases and Investigative Panel Reprimands in twenty-four cases.
See 2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
6 (2017), https://www.gabar.orgfbarrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/17_OGCRepor
t.pdf.
3. Lawyers in Georgia can voluntarily surrender their licenses or submit a petition
for voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-110(f) (2016). The acceptance
of a voluntary surrender of a license or the granting of a petition for voluntary discipline of
disbarment are tantamount to disbarment by the court and are treated as such in this
Article. Id.
4. In re Rose, 299 Ga. 665, 665-66, 791 S.E.2d 1, 1-2 (2016).
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In the meantime, the lawyer either misused the funds or commingled
them with his own. To satisfy the seller's claim, the lawyer had to deposit
personal funds into the trust account.5
2. Client Abandonment and/or Lack of Conununication
The supreme court disbarred four lawyers during the survey period
primarily for client abandonment and failure to communicate.
Kurt A. Raulin defaulted in the disciplinary process with respect to
two matters and therefore admitted that he had "failed to abide by [his
clients'] decisions regarding the scope and objectives of the
representation," 6 failed to act diligently, and failed to communicate
adequately.7 He was representing one of those clients while he was under
suspension for an earlier disciplinary violation. 8
Richard R. Buckley, Jr. was disbarred in connection with five
disciplinary matters to which he did not file any notices of rejection. 9 In
one matter, Buckley failed to respond to orders of the court. In the other
four, he undertook to represent clients, accepted retainers, abandoned
the clients, and did not refund the fees. 10
The court disbarred Ted H. Reed, a lawyer with an extensive record of
prior discipline." The special master found that Reed violated his duties
of diligence and of communication regarding the representation of a
divorce client, who:
[T]estified that he experienced considerable difficulty in
communicating with Reed and that Reed failed to undertake the steps
necessary to ensure the correction of the final order in the divorce
proceedings, which order failed to protect the client's pension, such
that the client was eventually required to obtain other counsel, and
incur the expenses attendant to doing so, in order to have the matter
12
resolved in his favor.

The court disbarred Morris P. Fair, Jr. for his conduct in two matters
and based on his disciplinary history. 13 In one of the matters, Fair
continued to represent the client while he was suspended, failed to

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 666, 791 S.E.2d at 1.
In re Raulin, 299 Ga. 283, 283, 787 S.E.2d 691, 692 (2016).
Id.
Id.
In re Buckley, 301 Ga. 47, 47-49, 799 S.E.2d 158, 159-60 (2017).
Id. at 48-49, 799 S.E.2d at 159-60.
In re Reed, 300 Ga. 643, 644-45, 797 S.E.2d 451, 452 (2017).
Id. at 643-44, 797 S.E.2d at 451-52.
In re Fair, Jr., 300 Ga. 655, 657, 797 S.E.2d 490, 491 (2017).
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respond to discovery or to motions, failed to consult or communicate with
his client, and failed to return the client's property after he withdrew.
The trial court struck the complaint that Fair filed for his client, barred
him from defending against the opposing party's counterclaim, and
awarded over $28,000 in attorney fees to the opposing party. In the other
matter, Fair undertook to represent a client in a criminal case but did
not communicate adequately with the client, ceased representing the
client without filing a motion to withdraw, and falsely represented to the
Bar that he had filed such a motion. 14
3. Criminal Activity
The supreme court disbarred eight lawyers during the survey period
for criminal activities. George D. Houser lost his license after he was
convicted of one felony count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud,
eight felony counts of payroll tax fraud, and two counts of failure to file
income taxes. 15 The supreme court disbarred another attorney when the
court of appeals affirmed his conviction for child molestation. 16 The court
disbarred Everett H. Mechem because he was convicted in federal court
of "[twenty-eight] counts of wire fraud, two counts of Supplemental
Security Income fraud, two counts of making a false statement, and one
count of theft of public money."17
Several lawyers who committed crimes voluntarily surrendered their
licenses. Holly De Rosa Hogue did so after she was convicted of a felony,
distribution of oxycodone and methamphetamine. 18 Lyle Vincent
Anderson voluntarily surrendered his license after he was convicted of
forgery for falsifying a fee agreement, 19 while Trent Carl Gaines
surrendered his license after he pled guilty to federal felony charges of
bid-rigging and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. 20 Samuel Elias Skelton
voluntarily surrendered his license after he pled guilty to felony counts
of theft by taking. 21
One lawyer was disbarred as a result of a misdemeanor. 22 Joanna
Temple was convicted in New York of a misdemeanor after advising

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 655-56, 797 S.E.2d at 490-91.
In re Houser, 299 Ga. 284, 284-86, 787 S.E.2d 689, 690-91 (2016).
In re Madison, 300 Ga. 637, 637, 639, 797 S.E.2d 476, 477-78 (2017).
In re Mechem, 301 Ga. 232, 232-33, 800 S.E.2d 277, 277 (2017).
In re Hogue, 299 Ga. 664, 664-65, 791 S.E.2d 2, 2 (2016).
In re Anderson, 299 Ga. 748, 748-49, 791 S.E.2d 769, 769 (2016).
In re Gaines, 300 Ga. 483, 483, 796 S.E.2d 251, 251 (2017).
In re Skelton, 300 Ga. 866, 866, 800 S.E.2d 514, 514 (2017).
In re Temple, 300 Ga. 484, 484-85, 796 S.E.2d 250, 250-51 (2017).
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clients about how to intentionally violate New York's usury law. 23 Her
assistance of the clients in the commission of crimes violated Rule 1.2(d) 24
of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 25 Her conviction of the
crime was also misconduct under Rule 8.4(a)(3), 26 which provides that it
is a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to
"be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the
underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law." 27
4. Miscellaneous Disbarments
The supreme court disbarred five lawyers for reasons that do not fit
neatly into the usual categories. The court disbarred Keith Brian
Harkleroad because he continued to practice after being suspended for
failure to complete mandatory continuing legal education and for failure
to pay Bar dues. 28 Harkleroad's suspension was discovered during his
defense of a client on murder charges:
The client's trial began on October 25, 2015, with Harkleroad
representing the client. Following that day's proceedings, the
prosecution learned that Harkleroad was not then a member in good
standing and advised the court of its discovery outside the presence of
the jury. According to the Notice of Discipline, Harkleroad told the
court that he had recently sent a check to pay his Bar dues and that
he acquired six hours of continuing legal education credit. The court
allowed Harkleroad to leave the courtroom to check on his membership
status. When Harkleroad returned, he told the court that he had
spoken with a representative of the Bar and had been told that he
needed eight hours of continuing legal education credit. The court
declared a mistrial in the client's murder case and filed a grievance
against Harkleroad. At that time, Harkleroad needed 18 hours of
continuing legal education credit and no check for payment of Bar dues
from Harkleroad was ever received by the Bar. Moreover, Harkleroad
did not cooperate with the Office of General Counsel's investigation of
this grievance and did not submit a response to the Notice of
Investigation. 29

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 484, 796 S.E.2d at 250.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
Temple, 300 Ga. at 484, 796 S.E.2d at 250.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3).
Id.
In re Harkleroad, 300 Ga. 762, 762-63, 798 S.E.2d 234, 235 (2017).
Id. at 762, 798 S.E.2d at 235.
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The court disbarred Harkleroad for violating Rule 5.5(a)30
(unauthorized practice of law), Rule 8.4(a)(4) 3 1 (professional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and Rule 9.332
(failure to respond to disciplinary authorities). 33
The court disbarred Ted. B. Herbert, who did not contest the
allegations against him. 34 Those allegations were that Herbert
represented two clients in a matter and advised them to destroy physical
and electronic evidence. During the pendency of the case, Herbert did not
act with diligence and did not communicate adequately with the clients.
The trial court eventually struck the answer and defenses of Herbert's
clients as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence, including the evidence
that the lawyer advised the clients to destroy. Herbert had three prior
disciplinary offenses, and the special master found no mitigating
circumstances.

35

The court also accepted the voluntary surrender of the license of
Chalmer E. Detling, I1.36 Detling settled a client's personal injury case
without the client's authority. Detling advised the court that his
daughter's serious medical issues left him unable to devote sufficient
attention to the client's matter. The State Bar of Georgia noted for the
court that Detling was under an emergency suspension and that a special
master had recommended in three other matters (pending before the
review panel) that he be disbarred. 37
The court also disbarred Christopher G. Nicholson. 38 While
representing a client, Nicholson intentionally signed a false affidavit and
caused harm to an insurance company. The company sued Nicholson and
obtained a judgment, which he refused to pay. Nicholson defaulted in
response to the grievance. During proceedings regarding aggravation and
mitigation, he engaged in disrespectful and disruptive conduct. 39 The
supreme court described some of that conduct in a footnote to its opinion:
Among other things, Nicholson referred to his disciplinary proceeding
as "a Star Chamber proceeding," claimed to "know [that the] fix is in,"
referred to the special master as the "High Executioner," and accused
30. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a).
31. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(4).
32.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 9.3.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Harkleroad, 300 Ga. at 763, 798 S.E.2d at 235.
In re Herbert, 299 Ga. 749, 749-51, 791 S.E.2d 769, 770-71 (2016).
Id. at 750-51, 791 S.E.2d at 770-71.
In re Detling, 300 Ga. 73, 73, 793 S.E.2d 41, 42 (2016).
Id. at 73, 793 S.E,2d at 41-42.
In re Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737, 742, 791 S.E.2d 776, 779 (2016).
Id. at 738-39, 791 S.E.2d at 777-78.

162

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

the special master of "making up the law and rules as you go to
preclude me from having a fair and impartial hearing." Nicholson
asked the special master if she had "any more homemade rules for me,"
adding that "[tihis hearing should be a blast." Nicholson variously
questioned the qualifications and impartiality of the special master,
alleging that the special master and State Bar counsel were "joined at
[t]he hip," accusing the special master of ruling against him without
reading his filings, and writing to the special master: "U r hopeless."
In a few e-mails, Nicholson revealed his failure to appreciate the
seriousness of the proceeding and the gravity of the violations with
which he was charged, referring to the proceeding as "nonsense,"
stating that "[the] whole proceeding is about nothing," and
sarcastically suggesting that the hearing be held at the Varsity
restaurant in Athens. He accused the special master and State Bar
counsel of lacking "professional courtesy [and] common decency." He
questioned why the State Bar was working with a "rogue judge" in his
home circuit, and he claimed that the special master had improper ex
parte communications with another judge in his home circuit. He
disrespectfully referred to the special master as "Ms. Hyphenated,"
and he claimed that the special master wanted only "to show me who
has [the] biggest member in the group." In one e-mail, he inquired
whether the special master had ever been married, noting that he
wanted to know the name of her husband so as to "get him [the]
Congressional Medal of Honor and/or sainthood," and adding that
"[y]ou are one mean[-]spirited and arbitrary woman. You are one of
40
many that are that way."
The court disbarred Nicholson in light of his misconduct, his
disciplinary history, the absence of remorse, his failure to provide
restitution, "and his repeated and contemptuous efforts to obstruct the
disciplinary process."4 1
The supreme court accepted the voluntary surrender of the license of
Timothy Eugene Moses.42 Moses violated the policies of his firm by
directly billing and accepting payments from clients of the firm. 43 Moses
admitted that this was misconduct under Rule 8.4(a)(4), which prohibits
"professional
conduct
involving
dishonesty,
fraud,
deceit
or
misrepresentation."44 Moses had already been disbarred for this conduct
45
in South Carolina.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 738 n.3, 791 S.E.2d at 777 n.3 (alterations in original).
Id. at 741, 791 S.E.2d at 779.
In re Moses, 299 Ga. 664, 664, 791 S.E.2d 2, 3 (2016).
Id. at 664, 791 S.E.2d at 3.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(4). See Moses, 299 Ga. at 664, 791 S.E.2d

at 3.
45. Moses, 299 Ga. at 664, 791 S.E.2d at 3.
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B. Suspensions46
1. Less Than Six Months
The supreme court suspended three lawyers for a period of time less
than six months.
Over one dissent, the court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline
and suspended Jon Gary Branan for one month, with the added discipline
of a Review Panel reprimand. 47 Branan represented a client in a personal
injury action and guaranteed a $10,000 bank loan for the client, with an
agreement that the loan would be repaid from the proceeds of the
personal injury case. After the case settled many years later but before
the proceeds were disbursed, Branan sued the client for the amount of
the loan and interest. In that suit, Branan falsely alleged that the source
of the debt was a personal loan he made to the client. 48 Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.349 was violated by Branan's misrepresentation
to the court.50 Branan offered in mitigation that he was remorseful and
was experiencing personal and professional challenges at the relevant
time. 51
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
imposed a three-month suspension on Daniel J. Saxton. 52 Saxton
represented one client who sought to renegotiate the terms of a mortgage,
and one who wanted to prevent a foreclosure. In both representations, all
of the clients' communications were with non-lawyer employees of
Saxton. 53 When the first client discharged Saxton, the lawyer sought a
release of any claims the client might have against the lawyer; however,
Saxton did not advise the client in writing, as required by Georgia Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.8(h),54 that it would be appropriate for the
client to have independent representation in connection with the
release.55 In the second case, a non-lawyer employee gave legal advice to
the client to file a meritless bankruptcy petition.5 6 In aggravation, the
court noted Saxton's substantial experience in the practice of law and two
46. This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and
does not discuss interim suspensions.
47. In re Branan, 300 Ga. 779, 781, 798 S.E.2d 218, 219 (2017).
48. Id. at 779-80, 792 S.E.2d at 218-19.
49.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Branan, 300 Ga. at 780, 798 S.E.2d at 219.
Id. at 779, 798 S.E.2d at 219.
In re Saxton, 299 Ga. 742, 744, 791 S.E.2d 773, 774 (2016).
Id. at 742-43, 791 S.E.2d at 773-74.

54.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h).

55. Saxton, 299 Ga. at 742, 791 S.E.2d at 773-74.
56. Id. at 743, 791 S.E.2d at 774.
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prior instances of discipline.57 The mitigating factors were "a timely good
faith effort to make restitution; a full and free disclosure and a
cooperative attitude toward these proceedings; and a reputation in the
community for integrity and good moral character."5 8
Over the objection of the State Bar of Georgia, the supreme court
accepted a petition for voluntary discipline from Richard J. Storrs and
imposed a three-month suspension.59 Storrs held approximately $15,000
of a client's money in his trust account to settle a claim against the client
by a subcontractor. While Storrs waited to hear from the subcontractor,
he withdrew just over $11,000 of that money for his personal use. When
the subcontractor contacted Storrs to resolve the dispute, Storrs
deposited personal funds into the trust account to replace what he had
taken.60 The supreme court noted in mitigation that Storrs was suffering
from emotional and mental distress at the time, that he had sought
counseling, that he had cooperated fully, that he had used personal funds
to make sure that no one was harmed, that he had a long record of
community and pro bono service, and that he had had only one
disciplinary matter, an admonition that was more than twenty years
before. 61
2. Six-Month Suspensions
The supreme court imposed six-month suspensions on three lawyers
during the survey period.
The supreme court gave a six-month suspension to Michael Robert
Johnson, who undertook the representation of a client, accepted a
retainer, and assigned the case to a disbarred lawyer who was working
for Johnson as a paralegal. 62 The disbarred lawyer had direct contact
with the client, while Johnson did not personally communicate with the
client. Johnson and the paralegal abandoned the matter, and Johnson
did not refund the unearned fee when the client fired him. Johnson had
been disciplined twice before, with a formal letter of admonition in 2012
and an Investigative Panel reprimand in 2016.63
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the petition of Jeffrey L. Sakas
for voluntary discipline in the form of a six-month suspension.64 Sakas

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
In re Storrs, 300 Ga. 68, 69, 792 S.E.2d 664, 665 (2016).
Id. at 68, 792 S.E.2d at 664-65.
Id. at 68-69, 792 S.E.2d at 665.
In re Johnson, 301 Ga. 231, 231-32, 800 S.E.2d 277, 278-79 (2017).
Id. at 231-32, 800 S.E.2d at 278.
In re Sakas, 301 Ga. 49, 51, 799 S.E.2d 157, 158 (2017).
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had undertaken but abandoned a legal malpractice claim for a client and
also initially failed to comply with an agreement to refund money to the
client after a fee arbitration. Sakas later paid the client the agreed-upon
amount.6 5 In mitigation of his admitted violation of his duty of diligence
under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3,66 Sakas noted "the
illness and death of his father; the subsequent health problems,
relocation, and ultimate death of his mother; his own health problems,
which required hospitalization and surgery; and the transfer of his law
practice to a new location."67 In aggravation, the court noted that Sakas
had substantial experience in the practice of law and had been
disciplined several times.66 The special master cited "ABA
Standard 4.42(a), which provides that suspension is generally
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client
and causes that client injury or potential injury." 69 The court agreed and
approved the six-month suspension as voluntary discipline. 70
The supreme court suspended L. Nicole Brantley for 180 days.71 The
court found Brantley had failed in her duties of diligence and
communication in several matters. 72 She also had not responded
appropriately to a grievance and to an inquiry from the Office of General
Counsel, and in one case she had not returned an unearned fee. In one
matter, Brantley did not have a written contingency fee agreement and
did not promptly return a signed release to an insurance company.
Brantley also practiced law while under suspension for nonpayment of
bar dues and had been disciplined five times previously.73 Nevertheless,
the supreme court determined that the 180-day suspension was
appropriate in light of mitigation evidence regarding Brantley's divorce
and her related depression, her need to support her family, her difficult
upbringing, and automobile accidents that caused significant injuries.74
Brantley also presented evidence regarding her involvement in her
church, her unconditional acceptance of responsibility for her actions, the
remedial steps she took to address her professional problems, and her

65. Id. at 49-50, 799 S.E.2d at 157.
66.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Sakas, 301 Ga. at 50, 799 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 50, 799 S.E.2d at 158.
Id. at 50-51, 799 S.E.2d at 158.
Id. at 51, 799 S.E.2d at 158.
In re Brantley, 299 Ga. 732, 735, 791 S.E.2d 783, 786 (2016).
Id. at 733, 791 S.E.2d at 784.
Id.
Id. at 734-35, 791 S.E.2d at 785.
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3. Suspensions of One Year or More
The supreme court suspended five lawyers for definite terms of one
year or more.
The court suspended Shanina Nashae Lank for one year after she
defaulted in three grievances and then filed a petition for voluntary
discipline.76 In two matters, Lank undertook to assist clients in civil suits
and instructed the clients not to attend hearings. Judgments were
entered against both clients, and Lank ceased communicating with them.
In one of the matters, Lank told the client she would move to set aside
the judgment before. ceasing communication, but never did so. The third
77
matter involved a deficiency of $47.33 in Lank's trust account. In
accepting the petition for voluntary discipline in the form of a one-year
suspension, the court noted that Lank offered in mitigation she had been
suffering from "serious medical issues including anxiety disorder, panic
attacks, dysthymic disorder, heart palpitations, depression, diabetic
complications, muscle spasms, and gastroenteritis." 78Lank also informed
the court she did not respond to the notices of investigation because she
was not in the office and did not receive them.79 The supreme court
accepted the petition and suspended Lank for one year, with
reinstatement contingent upon client restitution and submission of "a
detailed, written evaluation by a board-certified and licensed mental
health professional concluding that she is fit to return to the practice of
law."8

0

The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
imposed a two-year suspension on William D. Hentz.8 1 Hentz had
received notices of discipline concerning five matters in which the lawyer
acted without diligence, failed to communicate with the client, or both. 82
The attorney sought a suspension of at least twelve months and listed
the following mitigating factors:
In mitigation of discipline, Hentz states that he suffered significant
personal and emotional problems, including his son's suicide, marital
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 734, 791 S.E.2d at 785.
In re Lank, 300 Ga. 479, 480, 483, 796 S.E.2d 252, 253, 255 (2017).
Id. at 479-80, 796 S.E.2d at 252-53.
Id. at 481, 796 S.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 480-81, 796 S.E.2d at 254.
Id. at 482, 796 S.E.2d at 254.
In re Hentz, 300 Ga. 413, 415, 794 S.E.2d 649, 651 (2016).
Id. at 413-14, 794 S.E.2d at 649-50.
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problems affecting his marriage of thirty-five years, his wife's
diagnosis with a rare cardiac disease, his youngest son's drug addiction
and incarceration, his daughter's drug addiction and the termination
of her parental rights, his inability to keep up with his Continuing
Legal Education requirements, the foreclosure of the building he
owned containing his law office, and the death of his canine
companion. 83
The court also noted several aggravating factors, including prior
discipline, "a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial
experience in the practice of law."84
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
imposed an eighteen-month suspension on Bonnie Monique Youn.8 5 Youn
had pled guilty to a federal misdemeanor "for having counseled,
commanded, and induced a client, who was not a Georgia resident, to
possess a Georgia driver's license" in connection with the client's attempt
to secure permanent resident status in the United States. 86 The attorney
admitted a violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(3),
which defines misconduct to include conviction for a "misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the
lawyer's fitness to practice law."87
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a suspension to run concurrently with a thirty-month suspension
that Ricardo L. Polk was already serving.88 A client fired Polk, and Polk
agreed to return the fee the client had paid. Polk did not do so, nor did he
satisfy an arbitration award regarding the fee. Polk did not file a sworn
response to the Notice of Investigation, and he had five prior instances of
discipline.89 The court ordered that reinstatement would be contingent
upon the lawyer satisfying the arbitration award and upon repayment to
a former client who was involved in an earlier grievance. 90
The supreme court suspended Alvis Melvin Moore for one year. 91
Moore failed to serve the district attorney with pleadings that Moore filed
for his client and then falsely represented in certificates of service that

83. Id. at 414-15, 794 S.E.2d at 649-51.
84. Id. at 415, 794 S.E.2d at 651.
85. In re Youn, 300 Ga. 134, 135, 793 S.E.2d 379, 381 (2016).
86. Id. at 134, 793 S.E.2d at 379.
87. Id. at 134 n.1, 793 S.E.2d at 379-80 n.1 (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.4(a)(3)).
88. In re Polk, 299 Ga. 746, 748, 791 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2016).
89. Id. at 747, 791 S.E.2d at 771-72.
90. Id. at 748, 791 S.E.2d at 772.
91. In re Moore, 300 Ga. 407, 409, 792 S.E.2d 324, 326 (2016).
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the district attorney had been served. Moore also falsely represented to
the trial court that he had communicated with the district attorney's
office about the availability of a confidential informant. Moore refused to
express remorse or acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct. 92 The
special master recommended an indefinite suspension, and the review
panel recommended a six-month suspension, but the supreme court
suspended Moore for one year. 93
4. Indefinite Suspension
The supreme court issued an indefinite suspension for Michella A.
Hickerson, who was licensed in both North Carolina and in Georgia.9 4
Hickerson was suspended in North Carolina for five years, with the
proviso that she could apply in one year to lift the suspension.9 5
Hickerson admitted that she had testified falsely in a deposition during
a divorce action involving third parties and had filed pleadings with false
statements in a civil action in which she, personally, was a defendant.
None of the conduct arose from Hickerson's practice of law. 96 The
supreme court imposed reciprocal discipline and suspended Hickerson
indefinitely, until she could demonstrate that the North Carolina
suspension had been lifted.97
C. Public Reprimands
The supreme court ordered three public reprimands during the survey
period.
Following violations of Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct 1.298 and
1.4,99 Thomas E. Stewart received a public reprimand. 100 Stewart
negligently failed to consult and communicate with his immigration
clients about developments in the law during the Obama administration
that had the potential of enabling the clients to stay legally in the United
States. The special master rejected allegations that the lawyer had
abandoned the matters in violation of Rule 1.3.101 The special master also

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 408, 792 S.E.2d at 325.
Id. at 408-09, 792 S.E.2d at 325-26.
In re Hickerson, 299 Ga. 857, 858, 792 S.E.2d 321, 321 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 857-58, 792 S.E.2d at 321.
Id. at 858, 792 S.E.2d at 321.

98.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2.

99.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.

100. In re Stewart, 301 Ga. 227, 230, 800 S.E.2d 279, 281 (2017). The Author served as
the special master in this case.
101. Id. at 228, 800 S.E.2d at 280.
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rejected the claims that the lawyer had violated Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct 5.3102 (training and supervision of non-lawyer

'

assistants) or Rule 5.5(a) (assisting in the unauthorized practice of law)
in connection with the activities of the lawyer's non-lawyer translator
and paralegal. 103 The special master noted in aggravation the lawyer had
substantial experience and that the clients were vulnerable, but the
special master also noted in mitigation the lawyer lacked a selfish or
dishonest motive, was remorseful, and had engaged in interim
rehabilitation. 104 The supreme court found no error in these
determinations and found that a public reprimand was the appropriate
discipline under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.1 0 5
The supreme court accepted David J. Farnham's petition for voluntary
discipline in the form of a public reprimand for admitted violations of his
duty of diligence (Rule 1.3), his duties in connection with withdrawal
from one case (Rule 1.16(d)),106 and his duty to supervise a non-lawyer
employee (Rule 5.3).107 With respect to the alleged 5.3 violation, the
grievance claimed Farnham had a non-lawyer employee who "routinely
held himself out as a lawyer" and "that Farnham paid that non-lawyer to
bring in potential personal injury clients who had not otherwise
contacted the firm."10 8 The grievance also alleged that Farnham "divided
legal fees with that non-lawyer" and "failed to properly supervise the nonlawyer." 0 9 Farnham's petition for voluntary discipline admitted that he
violated Rule 5.3 only "by not maintaining adequate direction and control
over the non-lawyer's activities." 110 Farnham responded to the Notice of
Investigation, but the Bar mistakenly reported that he had not done so,
and the lawyer was wrongfully suspended as a result. The lack of
diligence arose from a divorce action in which Farnham misplaced the
final order that would have settled the case and did not show up at a later
status conference, with the result that the court dismissed the action.
Farnham filed a renewed action and missed two status conferences in
that case, after which the client fired him.11

102. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3.
103. Stewart, 301 Ga. at 228-29, 800 S.E.2d at 280.
104. Id. at 229, 800 S.E.2d at 281.
105. Id. at 229-30, 800 S.E.2d at 281.
106. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d).
107. In re Farnham, 300 Ga. 645, 647, 797 S.E.2d 84, 86-87 (2017); GA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.3.
108. Farnham, 300 Ga. at 645, 797 S.E.2d at 85.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 645-46, 797 S.E.2d at 85-86.
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In another matter, Farnham filed a personal injury case in the state
court system but purported to hand it off to another lawyer in his office
when the defendant removed the case to federal court. Because he failed
to withdraw and file a motion to substitute counsel, his client failed to
respond to discovery. The client eventually lost on summary judgment. 112
The special master and the State Bar of Georgia agreed that a public
reprimand would be the appropriate discipline, and the supreme court
agreed "under the particular facts of this case, including the fact that the
Bar appears to admit that Farnham was suspended erroneously for more
than a month in relation to these matters." 113
The supreme court imposed a public reprimand on Michael Anthony
Eddings, whose wife had stolen $2.3 million from the lawyer's trust
account while she was serving as his firm's office manager. 114 The Review
Panel had recommended disbarment. 115 The court declined to discipline
the lawyer under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3, which
governs the lawyer's obligations with respect to non-lawyer personnel
such as the wife.1 16 Rule 5.3(a) requires lawyers to "make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the [lawyer]" and Rule 5.3(b) states that "a lawyer having
direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer." 117 The court found that Eddings
was the victim of an elaborate fraud and that there was insufficient
evidence that either his procedures or his supervision were
unreasonable.1 18 The court did find, however, violations of
Rule 1.15(I)(c), 1 19 which provides that "a lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive,"120 and Rule 1.15(II)(b),1 21 which
provides "[r]ecords on [an attorney's] trust accounts shall be so kept and
maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 646, 797 S.E.2d at 85-86.
Id. at 647, 797 S.E.2d at 86.
In re Eddings, 300 Ga. 419, 419, 425, 795 S.E.2d 183, 183-84, 188 (2016).
Id. at 419, 795 S.E.2d at 183-84.
Id. at 421-22, 795 S.E.2d at 185.
Id. at 422, 795 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a)-(b)).
Id. at 422-23, 795 S.E.2d at 186.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. 15(I)(c).
Id.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(II)(b).
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or third person."1 22 The lawyer's lack of knowledge of his wife's actions
was not a defense to these violations. 123 The court concluded that a public
reprimand was appropriate in light of numerous mitigating factors,
including the lack of a disciplinary record, the absence of any selfish or
dishonest motive, his efforts to rectify the consequences of what
happened, his cooperative attitude during the proceedings, the lawyer's
good character and community service, and his remorse. 124
D. Review Panel Reprimands
The supreme court approved Review Panel reprimands for five
lawyers during the survey period.
The court accepted John Andrew Leslie's petition for voluntary
discipline in the form of a Review Panel reprimand. 125 In two cases, Leslie
represented plaintiffs but, after an initial period of effort, he allowed the
cases to linger so long that they were dismissed with prejudice. 126 Leslie's
inaction violated Rule 1.3 (diligence), Rule 1.4 (communication), 127 and
Rule 3.2 (expediting litigation). 1 28 Leslie offered in mitigation that he was
suffering from depression (for which he had begun to receive treatment)
and that his practice was understaffed (a deficiency he had since
remedied). Leslie cooperated in dealings with his insurance company to
obtain compensation for his clients. 129 The court agreed that a Review
Panel reprimand would be the appropriate discipline. 130
Gary Lanier Coulter petitioned successfully for voluntary discipline in
the form of a Review Panel reprimand.131 Coulter admitted to charging
an unreasonable fee of $187,000 in a complex probate matter. When the
client retained new counsel and disputed the fee, Coulter agreed to
refund $30,000 but was financially unable to do so on the timetable to
which the parties agreed. Coulter had no disciplinary history in a thirtyfour-year legal career and stated that, although he had charged an
unreasonable fee, he had not intended to do so. Coulter also noted that
he had been unable to repay the client because of his declining law

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Eddings, 300 Ga. at 423, 795 S.E.2d at 186.
Id. at 423-24, 795 S.E.2d at 186-87.
In re Leslie, 300 Ga. 774, 776, 798 S.E.2d 221, 223 (2017).
Id. at 775, 798 S.E.2d at 222.

127.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.

128.
129.
130.
131.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2; Leslie, 300 Ga. at 775, 798 S.E.2d at 223.
Leslie, 300 Ga. at 775-76, 798 S.E.2d at 222-23.
Id. at 776, 798 S.E.2d at 223.
In re Coulter, 300 Ga. 654, 655, 797 S.E.2d 492, 493 (2017).
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practice but he fully intended to honor the obligation.132 The court agreed
with the State Bar of Georgia that a reprimand would be the appropriate
discipline and chose a Review Panel reprimand rather than a public
reprimand. 133
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
imposed a Review Panel reprimand on David Edmund Ralston. 134
Ralston represented clients in a personal injury case and loaned the
clients $22,000 for living expenses, pending the resolution of the case.
Ralston professed not to know that Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.8(e) 135 was violated with such assistance. The attorney agreed
not to seek reimbursement of the loan. 136 The court noted that no clients
had been harmed and Ralston had not received any financial benefit. 137
The supreme court accepted a voluntary petition for discipline from
Nicole Jones and imposed a Review Panel reprimand.138 Jones admitted
that, in one case, she failed to file a civil case promptly, as requested by
the client, and that her office sent the client misleading form letters
about the status of the matter. In another case, Jones failed to timely
respond to a grievance about an appeal she had filed and that was
ultimately dismissed. Jones had no prior disciplinary history. 139
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a Review Panel reprimand from Tiffini Colette Bell. 140 Bell
admitted that, in representing a client in a child custody case, she did not
truthfully communicate with the client about discovery and the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, she did not timely respond to
discovery, she did not seek the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and
she did not adequately prepare for certain hearings. Bell had received a
confidential reprimand from the Investigative Panel in 2015. In
mitigation, Bell showed remorse and cooperation and noted that she did
141
not act from a selfish motive.

132. Id. at 654, 797 S.E.2d at 492.
133. Id. at 655, 797 S.E.2d at 493.
134. In re Ralston, 300 Ga. 416, 418, 794 S.E.2d 646, 648 (2016).
135.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Ralston, 300 Ga. at 416-17, 794 S.E.2d at 647-48.
Id. at 418, 794 S.E.2d at 648.
In re Jones, 299 Ga. 736, 737, 791 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2016).
Id. at 736-37, 791 S.E.2d at 775.
In re Bell, 299 Ga. 143, 144, 787 S.E.2d 166, 166 (2016).
Id. at 143-44, 787 S.E.2d at 166.
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E. Petitionsfor Voluntary DisciplineRejected
The supreme court rejected eleven petitions for voluntary discipline
during the survey period.
The court rejected the petition of Clarence R. Johnson, Jr. for
voluntary discipline in the form of a Review Panel reprimand or a public
reprimand. 142 Johnson admitted he had deposited personal funds in his
trust account to protect them from his creditors. He also admitted he did
not maintain adequate records of the funds in his trust account and that
he had deposited client settlement funds in his operating account, which
put those funds at risk from the lawyer's creditors. 143 The supreme court
concluded that a Review Panel reprimand or a public reprimand would
be insufficient on these facts, particularly because Johnson acted
intentionally over a period of time, harmed his creditors by concealing
his assets, and could have harmed his clients by making their funds
subject to his creditors. 144
The supreme court rejected the petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a ninety-day suspension of S. Quinn Johnson, who was the subject
of six disciplinary matters. 145 Several involved client abandonment,
failure to communicate, and failure to refund prepaid fees. Johnson also
filed a notice of appearance in magistrate court while he was under
interim suspension and, in another case, had mishandled the settlement
of a personal injury case. 146 The court rejected the petition because of
aggravating factors, including three prior suspensions and a letter of
admonition, the abandonment of clients in multiple matters, the
retention of fees paid regarding those matters, and the failure to make
restitution to clients. 147
The supreme court rejected a special master's recommendation that it
accept John Benneth Iwu's petition for voluntary discipline in the form
of a public reprimand. 148 Iwu had been suspended for nonpayment of dues
but nevertheless filed an answer and counterclaim in magistrate court
on behalf of a client, in violation of a Rule 5.5(a) prohibition on the
unauthorized practice of law. In response to the formal complaint, Iwu:
[F]alsely stated that he was unaware of his suspension because
someone else in his building signed off on his notice of suspension

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

In re Johnson, 299 Ga. 744, 746, 791 S.E.2d 779, 781 (2016).
Id. at 744-45, 791 S.E.2d at 780.
Id. at 746, 791 S.E.2d at 781.
In re Johnson, 301 Ga. 264, 265-266, 800 S.E.2d 570, 571, 573 (2017).
Id. at 264-65, 800 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 266, 800 S.E.2d at 573.
In re Iwu, 301 Ga. 52, 54, 799 S.E.2d 155, 156 (2017).
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letter from the State Bar but never gave it to him, and claimed he
believed he was eligible to practice law even though he had not paid

his dues

.... 149

The court rejected the petition because Iwu's actions "[were] at least
in part intentional," and he had engaged in a "pattern of deception
evidenced by his false statements in an attempt to avoid culpability."1 5 0
The court also noted that Iwu failed to admit in his petition violating his
duty under Rule 8.1(a)151 (knowingly making a false statement of
material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter) or Rule 8.4(a)(4)
(engaging in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation). 1 52
The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline from
Samuel Williams, Jr., who had been convicted in Alabama of the felony
of selling unregistered securities. 153 Williams had been sentenced to
three to five years of probation in 2012 and promptly self-reported the
conviction to the State Bar of Georgia. The disciplinary proceeding began
four years later, in 2016, and Williams sought a suspension that would
last as long as his probation. His probation was scheduled to end in April
2017.154 Williams offered the following in mitigation:
In mitigation, Williams explains that he was under considerable
mental and emotional stress because of the near-concurrent
bankruptcy of his law firm and diagnosis of his wife with metastatic
breast cancer in the fall of 2009; that he has no prior disciplinary
history or criminal record; that he served honorably in the military for
20 years; that he self-reported his conviction to the disciplinary
authorities and has been cooperative; that his failure to register the
securities was negligent and unintentional; that his failure to reject or
secure the $380,000 was negligent and without a selfish motive; that
he is sincerely remorseful; that he has attempted to improve his own
understanding of the law and to help others avoid the mistakes he
made; and that he has complied with all of the terms of his probation.
Williams also asserts that the nearly four-year delay between his selfreporting of the violation and the petition for appointment of a special
master should be considered in mitigation. Additionally, the Alabama
prosecutor sent a letter to the Bar saying that Williams was
inexperienced, distressed because of his wife's illness, and extremely

149. Id. at 52-53, 799 S.E.2d at 155-56.
150. Id. at 54, 799 S.E.2d at 156.
151. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1(a).

152. Iwu, 301 Ga. at 54, 799 S.E.2d at 156.
153. In re Williams, Jr., 300 Ga. 781, 781, 784, 798 S.E.2d 215, 216, 218 (2017).
154. Id. at 781-83, 798 S.E.2d at 216-17.
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remorseful, and that the trial judge concluded that Williams's
involvement in the criminal scheme was minimal.1 55
The court noted that acceptance of the petition would mean Williams
would be suspended for only one month for criminal conduct directly
related to his law practice and from which he personally profited. 156 The
court noted the "deplorable delay" between Williams's self-report of the
conviction and the start of the disciplinary proceedings but saw no
evidence that Williams had voluntarily ceased practicing law during that
time.15 7 There was no evidence, therefore, that the suspension for the
duration of his probation would, in effect, be any more than a one-month
suspension.158
The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline for
Emmanuel Lucas West, who had agreed to represent a citizen of
Guatemala in seeking asylum in the United States.15 9 West did not read
the application to his client in Spanish, and West signed the client's name
on the application and supporting documents.160 One of those signatures
was made under penalty of perjury, with the attestation that the client
had signed the document in the presence of West. The explanation given
by West was that "he signed the client's name knowing that an applicant
generally is allowed to amend or supplement his or her application freely
up until the time of the hearing, and maintains that he fully intended to
supplement with the client's real signature at a later date."1 6 1 West
admitted this conduct violated Rule 1.2(a)1 62 and Rule 1.4 because the
lawyer failed to consult with his client about the means that the lawyer
would use to achieve the client's objective. West would not, however,
admit to violating Rule 8.4(a)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, deceit,
fraud, or misrepresentation) because, he claimed, he did not have the
requisite "mental culpability."163 According to the court, the Bar stated
"summarily that West's admissions do not provide a compelling reason
to believe his misconduct rose to the level of violation of' Rule 8.4(a)(4)
without explaining why, and also asserted "that whether he violated

155. Id. at 782, 798 S.E.2d at 216.
156. Id. at 783, 798 S.E.2d at 217.
157. Id. at 784, 798 S.E.2d at 217.
158. Id. at 783, 798 S.E.2d at 217.
159. In re West, 300 Ga. 777, 777, 779, 798 S.E.2d 219, 220-21 (2017). The supreme
court also rejected an earlier petition for voluntary discipline from West. In re West, 299
Ga. 731, 732, 791 S.E.2d 781, 783 (2016).
160. West, 300 Ga. at 777, 798 S.E.2d at 220.
161. Id.
162. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
163. West, 300 Ga. at 777-78, 798 S.E.2d at 220.
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Rule 8.4(a)(4) [was] immaterial to the recommended sanction."1 64 The
court noted the seriousness of an alleged violation of 8.4(a)(4) and
rejected the petition because the Bar had not adequately addressed the
allegation that West had violated that rule.165
The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a reprimand from Christopher John Palazzola. 166 Palazzola
promised his associates that he would set up an IRA plan for them and
match their contributions, but he placed their withheld contributions in
a firm account and did not create a plan or match the contributions.
Palazolla admitted these actions violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) (conduct
involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation). Palazolla also
engaged in false advertising when he claimed that lawyers in his firm
had more than 100 years of combined experience (in fact, the correct
number was eighteen) and that his firm had offices in Miami and Los
Angeles (it did not). 167 Palazolla admitted to violating Rules 7.1168 and
8.4(a)(4) with these false advertisements that were likely to create an
unjustified expectation about the results the firm could achieve.1 6 9
Palazolla also violated the rules of conduct in how he and his staff
handled the departure of his associates. Palazolla violated Rule 5.3 by
not adequately supervising staff members, who failed to give a client the
associate's new contact information and who failed to forward to the
associate attorney official correspondence concerning a client from the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Palazolla violated
Rule 1.16 by failing to forward a client's file to the former associate as
requested by the client.1 70 The State Bar of Georgia and the special
master recommended a reprimand (without specifying whether that
would be a public reprimand or a Review Panel reprimand), but the
supreme court rejected the petition, concluding "that a reprimand is
inadequate under these circumstances, particularly given the number of
Rules violations." 171
The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a one-year suspension from Shannon Briley-Holmes. 172 With
respect to the representation of numerous clients, Briley-Holmes
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Id. at 778, 798 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
In re Palazolla, 300 Ga. 785, 789, 798 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2017).
Id. at 785-86, 798 S.E.2d at 212-13.
GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 7.1.
Palazolla, 300 Ga. at 786, 798 S.E.2d at 213.
Id. at 786-87, 798 S.E.2d at 213-14.
Id. at 787-89, 798 S.E.2d at 214-15.
In re Briley-Holmes, 300 Ga. 648, 653, 797 S.E.2d 123, 126-27 (2017).
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admitted to violating her duty of diligence under Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.3 four times, her duty of communication under
Rule 1.4 once, and Rule 1.16(d)'s requirement that she refund unearned
fees three times. 173 The court rejected the petition, despite the Bar's
74
recommendation that it be accepted.1
The supreme court rejected the petition from John Michael Spain for
voluntary discipline in the form of a public reprimand for having pled
nolo contendere to one misdemeanor count of stalking and one
misdemeanor count of harassing communications. 175 The details were:
He states that the charges to which he pled nolo contendere were based
on numerous emails that he sent over an approximately two-day
period to opposing counsel in a divorce case, in which he is the
defendant, and that he was acting pro se at the time, although he has
since retained counsel. Spain further admits that the emails included
inappropriate threatening language, intimidation and personal
attacks directed to opposing counsel, including inappropriate remarks
about counsel and members of her family, and ad hominem statements
about his wife. He admits that by virtue of his convictions, he has
violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 176
The court rejected the petition and noted that, for violations of
Rule 8.4(a)(3), the court had indicated that suspension or disbarment are
the appropriate sanctions, depending upon the circumstances of the
case.177

The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline from
Cameron Shahab. 178 Shahab sought a review panel reprimand or a public
reprimand as sanction for his failures to pursue immigration matters for
two clients, to notify one client of a hearing (as a result of which the client
was ordered deported), to provide information to the clients, and to pay
two fee arbitration judgments.179 Shahab claimed to have made partial
payments on the awards, but the court found that to be a
misrepresentation and on that basis rejected the petition. 1s

173. Id. at 648-51, 797 S.E.2d at 123-25.
174. Id. at 653, 797 S.E.2d at 126-27.
175. In re Spain, 300 Ga. 641, 641, 643, 797 S.E.2d 452, 453-54 (2017).
176. Id. at 641-42, 797 S.E.2d at 453. Under Rule 8.4, it is misconduct "to be convicted
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the
lawyer's fitness to practice law." GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(3).
177. Spain, 300 Ga. at 642-43, 797 S.E.2d at 453-54.
178. In re Shahab, 300 Ga. 411, 412, 794 S.E.2d 651, 652 (2016).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a Review Panel reprimand from Nolen Arthur Hamer.18 1 Hamer
admitted that he violated his duties of diligence and communication in
his representation of three clients. He also admitted particularly that he
delegated most client communications to his non-lawyer assistant and
that he had not maintained a trust account and had deposited client
payments directly into his operating account. The State Bar of Georgia
agreed that a Review Panel reprimand would be appropriate
discipline. 182 The supreme court disagreed and noted that "there is no
evidence that Hamer has refunded unearned fees, no explanation for his
failure to have an Interest on Lawyer Trust Account, and no indication
that he has sought input and assistance from the State Bar's Law
Management Program regarding the day-to-day management of his
practice." 183
The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline in which
Trent Carl Gaines sought a three-year suspension.184 Gaines pled guilty
in federal court to the felonies of engaging in conspiracy to commit mail
fraud and conspiracy to engage in rigging bids for the sale of real estate
at public foreclosure auctions. The crimes were committed for the
lawyer's personal benefit and not during the lawyer's representation of
clients. The underlying conduct occurred between 2006 and 2011.185
F. Miscellaneous DisciplinaryCases
The supreme court decided three miscellaneous disciplinary cases
during the survey period.
David R. Sicay-Perrow held licenses in Tennessee and Georgia and had
been disbarred in Tennessee with a conditional right to reinstatement. 186
The Review Panel recommended that he be suspended for three years in
Georgia as reciprocal discipline, based upon its conclusion that such a
suspension would be the discipline that most closely resembled what the
Tennessee Supreme Court had ordered. 187 The supreme court rejected
that recommendation and remanded the case to the Review Panel after

181. In re Hamer, 300 Ga. 70, 72, 792 S.E.2d 707, 708-09 (2016).
182. Id. at 70-72, 792 S.E.2d at 707-08.
183. Id. at 72, 792 S.E.2d at 708-09.
184. In re Gaines, 299 Ga. 662, 663, 791 S.E.2d 3, 4 (2016).
185. Id. at 663-64, 791 S.E.2d at 662. Later in the survey year, Gaines voluntarily
surrendered his license. Gaines, 300 Ga. at 483, 796 S.E.2d at 251; see discussion supra
Section II.A.3.
186. In re Sicay-Perrow, 300 Ga. 136, 136, 793 S.E.2d 377, 377 (2016).
187. Id.
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noting the closer similarities between the Tennessee discipline and an
order of disbarment in Georgia.1 88
In an unusual case, the supreme court decided not to impose any
discipline on an inexperienced prosecutor who failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense before a trial involving sex crimes
against a child.1 89 The victim initially told authorities in a recorded
statement that the defendant had committed oral and anal sodomy with
the child. A week before trial, the victim told the lawyer about the oral
sodomy but told the lawyer that the defendant had never "touched [his]
butt."1 90 The lawyer did not reveal this statement to the defense before
trial, 191 despite the requirement in Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.8(d)1 92 that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall "make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates
the offense."193
At trial, the prosecutor presented the victim's recorded statement that
described both oral and anal sodomy. The prosecutor then elicited
testimony from the victim that the defendant had only engaged in oral
sodomy. In closing, the prosecutor acknowledged the inconsistency and
conceded that the defendant should be acquitted of anal sodomy, and the
jury convicted the defendant only of oral sodomy. Defense counsel sought
a new trial when the child's statement the week before trial came to light.
The state consented to a new trial. 194
The supreme court conflated the obligations of the prosecutor under
Rule 3.8(d) and the prosecutor's related but slightly different obligations
under Brady v. Maryland,195 and subsequent cases that expanded Brady.
The last sentences of the supreme court's opinion states that "we cannot
say on the record now before us that the State Bar has shown a clear-cut
Brady violation. We conclude that no discipline is warranted under
Rule 3.8(d)."196 In footnote 11, the court acknowledges that the
constitutional doctrine in Brady and its progeny may not be coextensive
with the reach of Rule 3.8.197

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 138, 793 S.E.2d at 378-79.
In re Lee, 301 Ga. 74, 74-75, 75 n.3, 799 S.E.2d 766, 767 n.3 (2017).
Id. at 75, 799 S.E.2d at 767-68.
Id.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d).

193. Id.
194. Lee, 301 Ga. at 75-76, 799 S.E.2d at 768.

195. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
196. Lee, 301 Ga. at 78-79, 799 S.E.2d at 770.
197. Id. at 79 n.11, 799 S.E.2d at 770 n.11.
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The child's statement was information known to the prosecutor that
tended to negate the defendant's guilt. The victim's testimony was surely
key evidence against the defendant, and the victim gave two varying
accounts of what happened and what did not happen. The only issue is
whether the prosecutor made timely disclosure to the defense by eliciting
the testimony at trial that the victim no longer claimed that the
defendant engaged in anal sodomy. Using cases that dealt with the Brady
doctrine rather than Rule 3.8(d), the supreme court held that disclosure
at trial was soon enough. 198 The court noted in footnote 11 that "the State
Bar in this case advances no reasoned argument that 'timely disclosure'
under Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure sooner than Brady."9
In another case, the supreme court granted a certificate of fitness for
readmission for an attorney who had been disbarred in 1999 because,
during his representation of a minor child in a personal injury case, the
lawyer:
[S]ettled the case without the permission of the child's guardian, failed
to deposit the settlement funds in his trust account, misrepresented
material facts to the insurer and the court, and ultimately attempted
to deliver the settlement funds to the child's guardian, but tendered a
check that was returned for insufficient funds.200
The lawyer demonstrated rehabilitation by expressing deep remorse,
taking responsibility for his misconduct, and by presenting evidence of
his substantial contributions to the community, including "over 20 letters
of support from religious leaders, business leaders, elected officials, and
attorneys, attesting to his character and substantial civic involvement in
the Savannah community, including his appointment to Savannah's
Metropolitan Planning Board." 201
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Cases in Which Claims of Ineffective Assistance Prevailed
1. Georgia Supreme Court
The supreme court reversed convictions in two cases based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel and, in another case, affirmed the
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel by a trial court that granted a
habeas corpus petition.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 77-78, 799 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 79 n.11, 799 S.E.2d at 770 n.11.
In re Ervin, 300 Ga. 658, 658-59, 797 S.E.2d 488, 489 (2017).
Id. at 658, 797 S.E.2d at 489.
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In Kennebrew v. State,202 the supreme court unanimously reversed a
conviction for malice murder and other related crimes because of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 203 The state introduced evidence it had
taken from a backpack that the police seized only after the defendant had
been handcuffed and removed from the room. The police searched the
backpack and found the evidence without a warrant six days after the
arrest. 204 Defense counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to

suppress the evidence, given that these circumstances did not support a
warrantless search incident to a lawful custodial arrest.205 The supreme
court also found trial counsel to be deficient for not objecting to the
prosecutor's "specific, extended argument" that the jury should infer guilt
from the defendant's pre-arrest silence. 206 The court concluded that the
evidence against the defendant, other than the evidence illegally seized,
was not overwhelming and, therefore, the defendant was able to show
sufficient harm from his trial counsel's unreasonable performance to
warrant reversal of the conviction. 207
In Fisher v. State,208 the supreme court reversed another murder
conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. 209 The defendant
was convicted largely on the testimony of a witness (Lewis) who claimed
to have been present for the murder but who alleged that he had no
involvement. 210 The defense attorney interviewed a witness (Clark) who
was prepared to testify that Lewis was a drug dealer who, a few days
before the murder, had been looking for the victim to collect on a debt
and had been "brandishing" a gun that was similar to the murder
weapon. Defense counsel did not subpoena Clark or notify him when the
trial was to occur, and as a result, Clark was not present at trial to testify.
Defense counsel compounded the problem by agreeing to a jury
instruction that the testimony of a single witness (such as Lewis) is
sufficient to establish a fact without including the proviso that, if the
witness is an accomplice, the fact must be corroborated. 211 Clark's
testimony would have supported an argument that Lewis was at least an

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

299 Ga. 864, 792 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
Id. at 874, 792 S.E.2d at 704.
Id. at 868-69, 792 S.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 871, 792 S.E.2d at 701-02.
Id. at 873, 792 S.E.2d at 703.
Id. at 874, 792 S.E.2d at 703-04.
299 Ga. 478, 788 S.E.2d 757 (2016).
Id. at 489, 788 S.E.2d at 765-66.
Id. at 480-82, 788 S.E.2d at 760-61.
Id. at 478, 788 S.E.2d at 758-59.
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accomplice to the murder.212 The court determined there were no
strategic reasons for defense counsel to have assumed that Clark would
show up, or for the failure to seek an instruction about accomplice
testimony. 2 13 In light of the centrality of the testimony of Lewis to the
prosecution's case, the court held there was sufficient prejudice to the
defendant from his counsel's deficiencies to reverse the defendant's
convictions. 214
In Taylor v. Metoyer,215 the supreme court affirmed the finding of a
habeas court that a criminal defendant had received ineffective
assistance of counsel. 216 The defendant was convicted of numerous counts
of armed robbery and related offenses, primarily based upon the
testimony of co-defendants who pled guilty and testified in exchange for
an agreement with the prosecution about their sentences. 217 The habeas
court held, and the supreme court agreed, that the defendant's appellate
counsel was ineffective because she did not raise the claim that trial
counsel was ineffective when he failed to cross-examine the
co-defendants
about
motive
or
bias,
or
challenge
their
mischaracterization of their deal with the prosecution as not involving
any "special deal" or "special treatment." 218 The court noted that the case
against the defendant was "underwhelming." 219 The court also found that
appellate counsel was ineffective when she raised a frivolous issue on
appeal, and when she presented other issues on appeal without sufficient
authorities, argument, or support in the record. 220

2. Georgia Court of Appeals
The court of appeals found ineffective assistance of counsel in four
cases during the survey period.
In Morris v. State,221 the court of appeals reversed a trial court's denial
of a defendant's motion for out-of-time appeal. 222 The court of appeals
held that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 484, 788 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 484-85, 788 S.E.2d at 762-63.
Id. at 486-89, 788 S.E.2d at 763-66.
299 Ga. 345, 788 S.E.2d 376 (2016).
Id. at 350, 788 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 345-46, 788 S.E.2d at 377.
Id. at 349, 788 S.E.2d at 380.
Id.
Id. at 349, 788 S.E.2d at 379-80.
338 Ga. App. 599, 791 S.E.2d 177 (2016).
Id. at 602, 791 S.E.2d at 179.
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the lawyer did not explain the defendant's appellate rights, including the
deadline for an appeal. 223
In Ingram v. State,224 the court of appeals reversed a trial court's
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea because of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 225 Trial counsel erroneously advised the client that
the client would be subject to sentencing as a recidivist. To avoid that
possibility, the defendant accepted a plea offer. 226 The State conceded
that the defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel and had
been prejudiced. 227
In McLaughlin v. State, 228 the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of a motion for new trial based upon ineffective assistance
of counsel. 229 The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault in the
stabbing of her boyfriend. 230 The defense was justification, and the court
held a hearing on that defense. 231 During the hearing, defense counsel
became aware of the long history of physical and emotional abuse that
the defendant had endured from her boyfriend, and defense counsel
correctly concluded that it would be possible to buttress the defense of
justification with expert testimony about "battered person's
syndrome." 232 Defense counsel incorrectly believed, however, that it
would have been fruitless to seek a continuance of the trial to seek expert
testimony, because, in effect, the trial had already begun with the
hearing on the motion to dismiss.

233

The court of appeals concluded that

the failure to seek a continuance was deficient performance and also
concluded that, if the lawyer had sought one, there was a reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been different. 234
In Taylor v. State,235 the court of appeals found that defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance with respect to misdemeanor charges of
driving without a valid license and operating a vehicle without a current
registration (the defendant was also convicted of vehicular homicide). 236
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 599, 791 S.E.2d at 177.
338 Ga. App. 552, 790 S.E.2d 641 (2016).
Id. at 555, 790 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 552-53, 790 S.E.2d at 642-43.
Id. at 553, 790 S.E.2d at 643.
338 Ga. App. 1, 789 S.E.2d 247 (2016).
Id. at 15, 789 S.E.2d at 258.
Id. at 1, 789 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 4, 789 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 12, 789 S.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 12, 789 S.E.2d at 256.
Id. at 13-15, 789 S.E.2d at 256-57.
377 Ga. App. 486, 788 S.E.2d 97 (2016).
Id. at 496-98, 788 S.E.2d at 107-08.
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The only evidence offered in support of the charges about the defendant's
license and registration was inadmissible hearsay from an Atlanta police
officer, and defense counsel did not object to this testimony. 237 The court
of appeals found that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance as
to these counts because "we cannot identify any reason why a reasonable
attorney would have decided not to object to the hearsay testimony that
provided the only evidentiary basis for a conviction of the traffic
offenses." 238
B. Cases in Which Findingsof Ineffective Assistance were Reversed
The supreme court reversed three findings of ineffective assistance,
and the court of appeals reversed one during the survey period.
In Bryson v. Jackson,239 a criminal defendant was convicted while
being represented by a lawyer. After the conviction, a second lawyer was
appointed to represent the defendant on appeal. Appellate counsel chose
to file an immediate appeal rather than a motion for new trial and
thereby waived any chance to claim that trial counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance. The habeas court found that appellate counsel
thereby rendered ineffective assistance. 240 The supreme court reversed
the habeas court, determining there was no reasonable probability that
the ultimate result would have been different if appellate counsel had
preserved the right to claim ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 241 The court
discussed each way in which trial counsel was allegedly ineffective and
concluded that, "[bjecause trial counsel did not render ineffective
assistance in any of the ways claimed by Jackson, Jackson cannot show
that he suffered actual prejudice resulting from his appellate counsel's
failure to preserve the issue of trial counsel's performance on direct
appeal." 242

In Hooks v. Walley, 243 the supreme court reversed another finding of
ineffective assistance. 244 A criminal defendant claimed that his first trial
counsel failed to communicate a plea offer. After the defendant was
convicted, new counsel handled the appeal and raised certain issues but
not the claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel based upon the failure to
communicate the plea offer. The habeas court granted the writ on the
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id. at 497, 788 S.E.2d at 108.
299 Ga. 751, 791 S.E.2d 43 (2016).
Id. at 752, 791 S.E.2d at 45-46.
Id. at 753, 791 S.E.2d at 46.
Id. at 755, 791 S.E.2d at 47.
299 Ga. 589, 791 S.E.2d 88 (2016).
Id. at 594, 791 S.E.2d at 92.
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basis of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for having not raised
this issue on appeal. 245 The supreme court reversed, holding- that there
was no evidence before the habeas court to overcome the presumption
that appellate counsel's decision not to raise the ineffectiveness of trial
counsel was a strategic choice rather than an unreasonable decision that
"only an incompetent attorney would adopt." 246
Shepard v. WilliamS 24 7 was the third case in which the supreme court
reversed a grant of habeas relief. 248 The court reversed the grant of
habeas relief to a defendant who pled guilty to murder. 249 Among the
grounds for the relief were that the Fulton County Public Defender's
Office had failed to provide "consistent representation" (there was no
evidence of how many public defenders had been assigned to the case at
various times) and that the public defender who represented the
defendant in connection with the plea had been appointed only two
months before trial. 250 The court reversed the first finding because the
warden had not been given sufficient notice of the claim of "inconsistent
representation" and rejected the second because "[w]e decline to hold as
a matter of law that the appointment of substitute counsel two months
before a scheduled trial renders an otherwise valid guilty plea
involuntary, especially where there is no evidence that the arguably
belated appointment prejudiced the defendant." 251
In State v. Banks,252 the court of appeals reversed a finding of
ineffective assistance. 253 A defendant was convicted of aggravated child
molestation and child molestation. The trial court granted a motion for
new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. 254 Lead defense
counsel had not been sworn in to the Georgia Bar at the time of trial:
The attorney designated as lead counsel began working in the
Brunswick Judicial Circuit Public Defender's Office in September
2013. At that time, she was sworn in under the Graduate Practice Act,
which permitted her to practice "through the end of the month where
I got my [blar results." See Supreme Court of Georgia Rules 97, 100.

245.
246.
S.E.2d
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 589-90, 791 S.E.2d at 89-90.
Id. at 592, 791 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Arrington v. Collins, 290 Ga. 603, 604, 724
372, 374 (2012)).
229 Ga. 437, 788 S.E.2d 428 (2016).
Id. at 443, 788 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 437, 788 S.E.2d at 429.
Id. at 430, 788 S.E.2d at 438.
Id. at 442, 788 S.E.2d at 432-33.
337 Ga. App. 749, 789 S.E.2d 620 (2016).
Id. at 749, 789 S.E.2d at 620.
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She was designated lead counsel on October 11, 2013, and she learned
that she passed the bar examination on October 25, 2013, the Friday
before Banks' trial began on the following Monday. She was later
sworn in as a member of the State Bar on November 7, 2013.255
The trial court's basis for granting the motion for new trial was that
lead counsel "was not properly mentored throughout the proceedings by
an experienced attorney and did not possess the knowledge necessary to
properly represent [Banks] in a capital case." 256 The court of appeals
reversed.2 57 The court summarized the various activities that lead
counsel engaged in and noted that there was no evidence in the record to
point to any specific error that lead counsel made. 258 The court also
emphasized that lead counsel was assisted by other, more experienced
members of the public defender's office. 259 Finally, the court held that the
more concerning issue" was that the defendant could not "invite error
only to challenge the alleged error after an unfavorable result at trial." 260
The court noted that the trial court knew of lead counsel's status and that
lead counsel did not express any objection to the trial court concerning
her inexperience. 26 1
C. Miscellaneous Ineffective Assistance Cases
Three additional cases from the court of appeals concerning ineffective
assistance warrant discussion.
In Gilmer v. State,262 the court of appeals, in a 6-3 decision, rejected
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 263 The defendant was
convicted of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Two
witnesses, an expert and a family friend, gave improper testimony that
bolstered the credibility of the victim. The defendant's lawyer did not
object in either instance. 264 The dissent noted that the defense attorney
testified there was no strategic reason not to object. 265 The majority
opinion, however, rejected the notion it was bound by the lawyer's
testimony and held that the court of appeals could objectively find a
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257.
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259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 755, 789 S.E.2d at 624.
Id. at 751, 789 S.E.2d at 621.
Id. at 758, 789 S.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 756, 789 S.E.2d at 624.
Id. at 757, 789 S.E.2d at 625.
Id.
Id. at 757-58, 789 S.E.2d at 625.
339 Ga. App. 593, 794 S.E.2d 653 (2016).
Id. at 593, 794 S.E.2d at 655.
Id. at 594-98, 794 S.E.2d at 656-58.
Id. at 603-04, 794 S.E.2d at 661-62 (6-3 decision) (McFadden, J., dissenting).
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reasonable basis for a strategy even when the defense lawyer states
subjectively that there was none. 266 The majority opinion then
articulated a strategy that would explain the failure to object to the
expert witness: The defense lawyer was attempting "to co-opt Whitmore
as his own expert witness to challenge the way that the forensic
interviews were conducted." 267 The majority opinion also concluded that
the failure to object to the bolstering testimony of the family friend was
a strategic choice to which it should defer. 268
The dissent concluded that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance
by not objecting to the bolstering testimony and that the failure to object
caused the correctness of the outcome to be in doubt. 269 With respect to
the reasonableness of the failure to object, Judge McFadden wrote:
A strategic choice is necessarily part of a strategy. It is a choice to forgo
one potential advantage in favor of another. Although a decision not to
object may be a part of a reasonable trial strategy, the record does not
show that trial counsel made any such decision in this case. To the
contrary, trial counsel's testimony shows that he made no decision at
all concerning the improper bolstering. Trial counsel admitted to
having no strategic reason for not objecting to the expert witness's
testimony, and while he explained his efforts to mitigate the family
friend's testimony, trial counsel did not indicate that he had done so
as an intentional strategic alternative to an objection; rather, he
simply did not think to object. The record does not reflect, nor did the
trial court find, that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to
object to the family friend's bolstering testimony but instead to subject
270
it to cross-examination.

The dissent also concluded that the defendant had shown prejudice. 271
Nevertheless, the majority ruled the defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel were rejected, and the convictions were affirmed. 272
In McNorrill v. State, 273 the court of appeals rejected a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon defense counsel's alleged
conflict of interest. 274 Two defendants were tried and convicted together
of hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of marijuana with the intent to

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 596, 794 S.E.2d at 657 (majority opinion).
Id. at 596-97, 794 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 598, 794 S.E.2d at 658.
Id. at 603, 794 S.E.2d at 661 (6-3 decision) (McFadden, J., dissenting).
Id. at 604, 794 S.E.2d at 662 (citations omitted).
Id. at 606-07, 794 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 593, 794 S.E.2d at 655 (majority opinion).
338 Ga. App. 466, 789 S.E.2d 823 (2016).
Id. at 466, 789 S.E.2d at 823.
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distribute, and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime. 275

The defendants were represented by lawyers in the same circuit public
defender's office. 276 The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a conflict
of one public defender is automatically imputed to all lawyers in the same
public defender's office. 277 The court of appeals nevertheless concluded
that McNorrill's lawyer did not have an actual conflict of interest that
adversely affected her performance 278, despite these facts:
McNorrill nevertheless argues that an actual conflict of interest arose
at one point before trial when the prosecutor offered him a plea
conditioned on McNorrill testifying against his co-defendant, thereby
causing McNorrill and his co-defendant to have interests that were
antagonistic to one another. However, McNorrill's trial counsel
testified at the new trial hearing that she fully informed McNorrill of
the plea offer, that she told him that it was his decision whether to
accept the offer, and that "it [had been] of no account to [her]" whether
McNorrill chose to testify against his co-defendant. Trial counsel also
testified that McNorrill was very "deferential" to his co-defendant and
looked to his co-defendant "for cues ... in making decisions about what
he wanted to do." The trial transcript reflects that when the plea offer
was later brought up in open court, McNorrill rejected the offer,
stating, "I would take the offer, but I don't want to testify." In light of

this combined record evidence, the trial court was entitled to find that
any potential conflict arising from the plea offer did not adversely
affect the manner in which trial counsel handled the offer or conveyed
it to McNorrill, and that McNorrill made his own independent decision
279
not to accept the offer because he did not want to testify at trial.

This result is questionable. The public defender who represented
McNorrill had an imputed conflict of interest because the co-defendants
were represented by other public defenders from the same office. 280 That
conflict may well have adversely affected the performance of McNorrill's
counsel precisely because the lawyer left the decision of the plea bargain
up to McNorrill and expressed indifference whether McNorrill accepted
it. It is certainly at least plausible that a lawyer whose representation
was untainted by the conflict would have encouraged McNorrill to

275. Id. at 469, 789 S.E.2d at 827.
276. Id. at 472, 789 S.E.2d at 829.
277. In re Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 399-400, 744 S.E.2d 798, 799800 (2013).
278. McNorrill, 338 Ga. App. at 472, 789 S.E.2d at 829.
279. Id. at 474, 789 S.E.2d at 830 (alterations in original).
280. See id. at 472, 789 S.E.2d at 829.
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overcome his deference to his co-defendants and make a good deal for
himself to the detriment of the co-defendant.
Finally, in Wiggins v. State, 281 the court of appeals rejected a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 282 Defense counsel listed a certain
person as a witness, and the prosecutor promised the jury in his opening
statement that the jury would hear from this witness. The prosecutor did
not subpoena the witness. Defense counsel decided not to call the witness
and told the witness not to come to court. The witness went home to
Texas. When the witness he had promised to produce for the jury was
suddenly unavailable, the prosecutor wrongfully threatened to prosecute
the defense counsel for obstruction of justice. 283 The trial court made a
comment to the effect that this was 'a serious accusation,' implicating a
criminal charge." 284 Defense counsel described the effect of these charges:
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Defense Counsel explained
that when the prosecutor said that he was investigating her during the
trial, "everything went off the rails." She stated that she spent that
afternoon during the trial on her phone texting to seek advice about
her own situation and further asserted that she was unable to prepare
for the next day of trial because she was listening to the jailhouse tapes
and addressing the issue of whether charges would be filed against
her. 285
The court of appeals searched the record and concluded there was no
instance in which defense counsel's performance had been deficient. 286
Therefore, the court held that under Strickland v. Washington,287 the
defendant could not show ineffective assistance of counsel. 288 The court
of appeals also considered the argument that defense counsel had a
conflict of interest in representing her client vigorously against a
prosecutor who was threatening to prosecute her. 289 The standard to
apply to such an argument is whether the lawyer had an actual conflict
of interest that adversely affected the lawyer's representation. 290 The
291
court of appeals rejected the argument.
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338 Ga. App. 273, 787 S.E.2d 357 (2016).
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IV. LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

The court of appeals decided three noteworthy cases during the survey
period related to legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.
In Engelman v. Kessler,292 the court of appeals affirmed a trial court's
grant of summary judgment on legal malpractice claims and remanded
for further consideration of claims of breaches of fiduciary duty. 293 The
lawyers represented the wife in a divorce case, and the wife alleged that
the lawyers committed malpractice by not adequately explaining a
prenuptial agreement and by not conducting sufficient investigation into
her husband's finances before advising her to seriously consider a
settlement offer from her husband. 294 The court of appeals examined the
record and determined that the lawyers had "analyzed the terms of
Engelman's prenuptial agreement and advised her as to the strengths
and weaknesses regarding the enforceability of the agreement." 295 The
court barred the wife's claim related to this advice on the basis of
judgmental immunity. 296 The court also held that the wife could not show
that any alleged malpractice was the cause of any damage because of her
own actions in disregard of her lawyers' advice:
Engelman voluntarily signed the divorce agreement, which she
negotiated and begged her attorneys to get ready for her to sign. As
detailed above, Engelman insisted on going forward with presenting a
counteroffer to her former husband's attorney in spite of the advice
from the attorneys to slow down and try to mediate. Kessler felt that
this decision to not follow his advice was so significant that he urged
Tobin to put in writing for Engelman the risks of sending the
counteroffer. Throughout the negotiations regarding the proposed
settlement agreement, Engelman continued to communicate to the
attorneys that it was urgent the settlement agreement get finalized
because she needed the money she would receive from the divorce in
order to buy a house. Tobin even tried to get Engelman to move back
her closing date on the house because it was in her best interest to slow
down.

292.
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294.
295.
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297.
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340 Ga. App. 239, 797 S.E.2d 160 (2017).
Id. at 239, 797 S.E.2d at 161.
Id. at 242, 797 S.E.2d at 164.
Id. at 244, 797 S.E.2d at 164.
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The court noted that the settlement agreement recited that the wife
was signing the agreement "without conducting the usual discovery and
without disclosure of the income and assets of the other."298
The fiduciary duty claim arose from the contract that the wife initially
signed with the law firm. 299 The contract provided for a $25,000 retainer,
earned upon receipt, for the firm's availability to assist with the matter.
The agreement also stated hourly rates for the lawyers but noted that
the rates were subject to being increased.3 00 The parties presented expert
evidence regarding whether this agreement conformed to the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct and advisory opinions regarding the
professional responsibilities of Georgia lawyers. The trial court denied
summary judgment. 301 The court of appeals remanded with the
instruction that the trial court should not consider expert opinions with
respect to whether the agreement violated public policy, an issue that the
court described as "a question of law for the court." 302
Estate of Nixon v. Barber303 involved two parents who retained an
attorney to represent their son regarding criminal charges. The son died
in a car accident. The parents sued the lawyer for malpractice in the
criminal case on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the son's estate.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 304 The court of appeals affirmed. 305 As for
the parents, the court concluded that the parents lacked standing to sue
for legal malpractice because they were not in an attorney-client
relationship with the lawyer. 306 There was no express contract for the
lawyer to represent the parents, and it was clear to the court from the
pleadings there was no basis for an implied attorney-client relationship
either: "Kathy and Bruce [the parents] could not have reasonably
believed that Barber represented them when all communications and
representations were made in the course of (and regarded) Barber's
representation of their son in defense against his criminal charges." 307
With respect to the claim by the estate, the lawyer claimed that he
could not be held liable for malpractice unless the estate could prove that
298. Id. at 246, 797 S.E.2d at 165.
299. Id. at 246-47, 797 S.E.2d at 166.
300. Id. at 240, 797 S.E.2d at 162.
301. Id. at 246-47, 797 S.E.2d at 166.
302. Id. at 247, 797 S.E.2d at 166 (quoting Tucker Materials (Georgia), Inc. v. Devito
Contracting & Supply, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 309, 310, 535 S.E.2d 858, 859 (2000)).
303. 340 Ga. App. 103, 796 S.E.2d 489 (2017).
304. Id. at 103, 796 S.E.2d at 490-91.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 105-09, 796 S.E.2d at 492-95.
307. Id. at 109, 796 S.E.2d at 494.

192

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

his client was factually innocent of the criminal charges alleged. The trial
court apparently dismissed the estate's claim on that basis. 308 The court
of appeals found no need to address the question, however, because it
deemed that the enumeration of error on this basis had been
abandoned. 309 The court did, however, include a lengthy footnote
regarding the various views that courts have taken with respect to this
question of causation in legal malpractice cases involving criminal
defense and noted that, had the enumeration not been abandoned, it
would have produced an issue of first impression in Georgia. 310
OTS, Inc. v. Weinstock & Scavo, P.C. 311 was a legal malpractice action
in which the law firm counterclaimed to collect on a promissory note
signed by one its former clients.312 One issue of particular note was one
part of the trial court's ruling on the law firm's motion to dismiss. The
plaintiffs claimed in part that the law firm breached the standard of care
by not compelling arbitration in the underlying case. 313 The court of
appeals affirmed the granting of the motion to dismiss because the claim
was too speculative. 314 The plaintiff failed "to cite relevant authority to
counter the trial court's finding that there was no set of circumstances
under which it could prove that it incurred additional fees or the
judgment against it based on a failure by the defendants to attempt to
compel arbitration." 315
V.

DISQUALIFICATION

The court of appeals decided four cases involving attorney
disqualification during the survey period.
In Kamara v. Henson,316 the plaintiff sued two defendants, a podiatrist
and his practice, for malpractice. The lawyer for the defendants had
represented the plaintiffs expert many years ago in an unrelated case.
The plaintiff sought disqualification of defense counsel on this basis. The
trial court denied the motion. 317 The plaintiff expressed concern that
defense counsel could use information that the lawyer gained in

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 110, 796 S.E.2d at 495.

Id.
Id. at 110 n.24, 796 S.E.2d at 495 n.24.
339 Ga. App. 511, 793 S.E.2d 672 (2016).
Id. at 511, 793 S.E.2d at 673-74.
Id. at 516-17, 793 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. at 517, 793 S.E.2d at 677.
Id.
340 Ga. App. 111, 796 S.E.2d 496 (2017).
Id. at 111, 796 S.E.2d at 498.
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representing the expert to cross-examine the expert. 318 The lawyer would
be prohibited from using the expert's confidential information to the
detriment of the expert under Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.9(c)(1), 319 but there was no evidence of counsel's ability or
inclination to do SO. 32 0 Given the lack of any relationship between the two
matters and the absence of any evidence of impropriety, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify. 321
In Befekadu v. Addis InternationalMoney Transfer, LLC, 322 the court
of appeals affirmed a trial court's order that disqualified an attorney as
counsel. 323 The lawyer, Oldham, previously represented the LLC and
drafted the articles of incorporation, obtained an employee identification
number, and served as registered agent. A dispute arose between the
entity and Befekadu (a part-owner of the entity), and the lawyer
attempted to represent Befekadu at trial against the lawyer's former
client. The trial judge disqualified the lawyer. In an earlier appeal, the
court of appeals remanded for a hearing to determine whether the
lawyer's prior representation of Addis was substantially related to the
dispute with Befekadu. 324 The trial court was directed to determine
whether the two matters were "materially and logically connected." 325 On
remand, the trial court found that there were such connections, and the
court of appeals affirmed in this opinion. 326 Judge McFadden
dissented. 327 He argued that the opinion gave insufficient weight to
Befekadu's right to counsel of his choice and also that the trial court did
not make the specific kind of finding that would justify
disqualification. 328 What Judge McFadden found missing in the trial
court's findings was "any specific fact or ... any special knowledge that
[Oldham] might have gleaned from [his prior representation of the LLC]
which would have been material to the present suit, or in any manner,
have gained advantage for the [defendant Befekadu] or worked a
disadvantage to [the LLC]."329
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
Moody,

Id. at 114, 796 S.E.2d at 500.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(1).
Kamara, 340 Ga. App. at 114-15, 796 S.E.2d at 500.
Id. at 116, 796 S.E.2d at 501.
339 Ga. App. 806, 795 S.E.2d 76 (2016).
Id. at 807, 795 S.E.2d at 77.
Id. at 807-10, 795 S.E.2d at 77-78.
Id.
Id. at 809-10, 795 S.E.2d at 78-79.
Id. at 810-13, 795 S.E.2d at 79-81 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
Id. at 811-13, 795 S.E.2d at 80-81.
Id. at 812, 795 S.E.2d at 80 (alterations in original) (quoting Cardinal Robotics v.
287 Ga. 18, 22, 694 S.E.2d 346, 349-50 (2010)).
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In State v. Mantooth,330 the Solicitor General of Cobb County recused
himself and his office in connection with the prosecution of a DUI
defendant because of the defendant's relationship to a member of the
solicitor general's staff. In accordance with statute, the attorney general
appointed a solicitor general pro tempore to prosecute the case. The
defendant challenged the recusal, and the trial court vacated the
attorney general's appointment of the solicitor-general pro tempore.331
The court of appeals held that the defendant did not have standing to
challenge the prosecutor's decision to recuse and that the trial court did
not have the authority to vacate the attorney general's appointment of a
substitute. 332
In Cohen v. Rogers,333 the court of appeals affirmed a trial court's order
that disqualified two attorneys (Butters and Cohen) for a defendant
(Brindle). 334 The plaintiff (Rogers) claimed that Brindle secretly made a
video recording of a sexual encounter between them. Rogers filed a
second related lawsuit, in which Butters and Cohen were defendants.
There were allegations that Butters and Cohen were involved in the
planning and the execution of Brindle's recording, which was illegal
under Georgia law. 335 Those allegations meant that the lawyers might be
witnesses, and it also raised the prospect of a conflict of interest between
the lawyers and their client. 336 The court of appeals declined to decide
whether the lawyers were disqualified because they were witnesses, but
the court determined no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision
to disqualify the lawyers because of a conflict of interest. 337 The trial
court noted, "'it is difficult for this Court to see how Mr. Cohen and Mr.
Butters do not have competing interests with their client, Ms. Brindle,'
and found a'substantial probability that these competing interests would
most likely hinder their independent professional judgment on pursuing
courses of action in Ms. Brindle's case."' 338 Without elaboration of the
precise nature of the conflict, the court of appeals concluded,
"[c]onsidering the circumstances surrounding this litigation, we find that

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

337 Ga. App. 698, 788 S.E.2d 584 (2016).
Id. at 699, 788 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 699-703, 788 S.E.2d at 585-88.
338 Ga. App. 156, 789 S.E.2d 352 (2016).
Id. at 156, 789 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 158-59, 789 S.E.2d at 354-55; see also O.C.G.A.
Cohen, 338 Ga. App. at 160-61, 789 S.E.2d at 357.
Id. at 169, 789 S.E.2d at 362.
Id. at 169-70, 789 S.E.2d at 363.

§

16-11-62 (2017).
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Butters and
339
Cohen from representing Brindle."

VI. JUDICIAL ETHICS
The supreme court decided two matters related to judicial ethics
during the survey period, while the court of appeals decided one.
Both of the matters before the supreme court involved judicial review
of formal advisory opinions of the Judicial Qualifications Commission
(JQC). In the first, the court directed the JQC to reconsider its opinion,
which dealt with the constitutional guarantee of public access to judicial
proceedings. 340 The court first held that it had the authority to review
advisory opinions of the JQC.341 The court then held that the JQC's
opinion was not just a question of interpretation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in light of well-established binding authority. 342 Instead, the
court held the JQC opinion had purported to decide questions of law,
which are outside the purview of the JQC.343
The second JQC opinion the supreme court reviewed during the survey
period concerned an amicus brief filed by the Council of State Court
Judges in a case that challenged the use of private companies to provide
probation supervision services in misdemeanor cases. 3 4 4 The JQC issued
Formal Advisory Opinion 241, which concluded that "the 'filing [of]
Amicus Curiae Briefs by judges, councils of judges or any other
organization of judges in cases pending in any trial or appellate court
would be improper and prohibited by the Georgia Code of Judicial
Conduct."' 345 The supreme court directed the JQC to reconsider its
opinion. 3 46 The court held that the JQC has authority over individual
judges but no authority to regulate the conduct of institutions such as the
Council of State Court Judges. 3 47 The court held further that, with
narrow exceptions, an individual judge may not file an amicus brief in a
pending case because to do so would run afoul of the prohibitions in the
Code of Judicial Conduct on a judge practicing law and on a judge making

339. Id. at 171, 789 S.E.2d at 363.
340. In re Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Formal Advisory Op. No. 239, 300 Ga. 291,
794 S.E.2d 631 (2016).
341. Id. at 292, 794 S.E.2d at 634.
342. Id. at 299-302, 794 S.E.2d at 639-41.
343. Id.
344. In re Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Formal Advisory Op. No. 241, 301 Ga. 54, 5455, 799 S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (2017).
345. Id. at 55, 799 S.E.2d at 783.
346. Id. at 55-56, 799 S.E.2d at 783.
347. Id. at 57, 799 S.E.2d at 784.
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public comments that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome
of a pending proceeding. 348 The court noted two exceptions to this general
rule, when the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity and when a "judge
is disqualified from ever deciding a legal issue because such a decision
would directly and personally affect him or her." 34 9
Evans v. WilliamS 350 was the one court of appeals case during the
survey period that involved judicial ethics. In response to a motion to
recuse, a trial judge referred the motion for disposition to another judge,
who denied the motion in an order that did not contain findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The original trial judge later granted summary
judgment. 351 The court of appeals vacated the summary judgment and
remanded the case for compliance with Uniform Superior Court
Rule 25.6,352 which requires written findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 353 The court of appeals noted that, if the motion to recuse is properly
denied on remand, then the trial court could reissue its ruling on
summary judgment. 354 If the motion to recuse was granted after all, then
the proceedings with the original trial judge that occurred after the
motion to recuse would be invalid. 355
VII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES

The supreme court decided three miscellaneous cases related to legal
ethics during the survey period, while the court of appeals decided two.
In Washington v. Hopson,356 the supreme court reversed an order in
which a habeas court had set aside a defendant's rape conviction because
of the misconduct of the prosecutor (Joshi).357 The defendant was
convicted based upon the testimony of the victim and a friend of the
victim. More than a year after the conviction, Joshi was in private
practice and offered to help the defendant's family overturn the
conviction because he "knew" the victim and her friend had lied at
trial. 358 The habeas court reached the following conclusions:

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 57-59, 799 S.E.2d at 784-85.
Id. at 59, 799 S.E.2d at 785.
341 Ga. App. 226, 799 S.E.2d 362 (2017).
Id. at 226, 799 S.E.2d at 362.
UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 25.6 (2017).
Evans, 341 Ga. App. at 226-27, 799 S.E.2d at 362-63.
Id. at 228, 799 S.E.2d at 364.
Id.
299 Ga. 358, 788 S.E.2d 362 (2016).
Id. at 358, 788 S.E.2d at 364.
Id. at 358-60, 788 S.E.2d at 364-65.
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The habeas court ruled that Joshi violated constitutional mandates by
"knowingly present[ing] testimony that he believed to be false" at
Hopson's trial and by "d[oing] nothing to stop the trial, even when he
called a witness whom he knew to be lying." The court based these
legal conclusions on its factual findings that Joshi "prosecuted Mr.
Hopson in spite of his knowledge that Mr. Hopson was innocent and in
spite of his knowledge that the alleged victim was lying," "suborned
the victim's testimony in spite of his knowledge that such testimony
was false," and "withheld exculpatory information involving his
knowledge [ofj the falsity of the alleged victim's testimony." (Emphasis
added.) In this way, the habeas court asserted, Joshi "let a man he
knew to be innocent be convicted of rape." 359
The supreme court agreed that the conviction would have to be
overturned if these were the facts, but the court held the factual findings
about Joshi's state of mind-that he knew the testimony was false-to be
clearly erroneous. 360 The court also held that the issue was barred by
collateral estoppel, because the trial court had found to the contrary and
the habeas court had no new evidence. 361 The supreme court also rejected
the conclusion of the habeas court that the conviction had to be set aside
because of the possibility that during the prosecution Joshi could have
been exercising the powers of his office for personal gain with one eye on
the prospect that he could help the defendant overturn the conviction
that he himself obtained. 362 The supreme court determined this prospect
to be too speculative, particularly given the long time lag between the
prosecution and Joshi's offer to help overturn it.363

359. Id. at 362-63, 788 S.E.2d at 367 (alterations in original).
360. Id. at 363-64, 788 S.E.2d at 367-68.
361. Id. at 364, 788 S.E.2d at 368.
362. Id. at 362, 788 S.E.2d at 366.
363. Id. The supreme court went to some lengths to elaborate on the prosecutor's ethical
responsibilities with respect to the presentation of evidence:
Prosecutors may not present evidence they know is false or fail to disclose
materially exculpatory evidence to the defense, but they need not share their
subjective concerns about the strengths or weaknesses of the State's case and
witnesses. Especially in close and serious cases, the prosecutor may allow the
jury to decide if an alleged crime victim-here, an alleged rape victim-is telling
the truth and thus is entitled to the justice she seeks, rather than making that
determination unilaterally and preemptively. See Rule 3.3 (a)(4), comment [81
("The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows
that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does
not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact."). Accordingly, even if Joshi
really doubted the truthfulness of the victim's testimony at the time of Hopson's
trial-rather than only in retrospect or only when asserting that belief served
his attempt to extract money from Hopson's family-that would not amount to
a constitutional violation. Based on the same information available to Joshi, the
jury believed the victim's testimony that she was raped by Hopson, and that is

198

MERCERLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 69

In another case, the supreme court affirmed a finding that a lawyer
was in contempt for continuing to file pleadings in a murder case in which
the trial court had prohibited such filings and had removed the lawyer as
counsel for the defendant. 364 The court rejected counsel's argument that
the underlying order was erroneous because the lawyer waived the
argument and because, in any event, it was still contempt to disobey an
erroneous order that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter.3 6 5 The court
also rejected the lawyer's claims that the evidence was insufficient to
show that her actions were willful, that she had not been advised at the
contempt hearing of her right to remain silent, and that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel. 366

In McHugh Fuller Law Group v. PruittHealth, Inc., F/k/a Pruitt
Corp.,367 a law firm ran printed advertisements seeking to represent
clients who had been injured in the nursing homes of PruittHealth. The
advertisements contained trade names, service marks, and logos of
PruittHealth, in addition to the logo of the law firm. 368 The trial court
enjoined the advertising under Georgia's anti-dilution statue, which
among other things protects the owner of a trademark from having the
trademark "tarnished" by another. 369 The supreme court reversed the
injunction because the use of the marks did not "tarnish" the marks in a
way that violated the anti-dilution statute:
The ad did not attempt to link PruittHealth's marks directly to
McHugh Fuller's own goods or services. McHugh Fuller was
advertising what it sells-legal services, which are neither
unwholesome nor degrading-under its own trade name, service mark,
and logo, each of which appears in the challenged ad. No one reading
the ad reproduced above would think that McHugh Fuller was doing
anything other than identifying a health care facility that the law firm
was willing to sue over its treatment of patients. In short, the ad very
370
clearly was an ad for a law firm and nothing more.

what counts. For these reasons, the habeas court erred in concluding that Joshi
violated Hopson's constitutional rights by allowing the victim to testify.
Id. at 365, 788 S.E.2d at 368.
364. In re Brinson, 299 Ga. 859, 859, 791 S.E.2d 804, 805 (2016).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 859-60, 791 S.E.2d at 805-06.
367. 300 Ga. 140, 794 S.E.2d 150 (2016).
368. Id. at 140-41, 794 S.E.2d at 151-52.
369. Id. at 144-47, 794 S.E.2d at 153-56.
370. Id. at 147, 794 S.E.2d at 156.
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The court also noted the potential constitutional problem with
restricting the law firm's advertising (assuming the advertisements were
truthful).371

Tolson Firm, LLC v. Sistrunk372 arose from the departure of an
associate from a law firm. The associate took several cases from the firm
to her new practice. 373 The court of appeals dealt with a number of issues,
but of particular interest is its discussion of the fiduciary duties that a
departing lawyer owes to a law firm. 37 4 The court concluded that there
were genuine issues of material fact about when the lawyer left the firm
and whether the lawyer improperly solicited clients of the firm before
departing. 375 The court offered this specific guidance: A departing lawyer
may (absent any agreement to a more permissive rule) solicit firm clients
on whose matters the lawyer is actively and substantially working but
only after telling the firm of the lawyer's intent to do so.

376

After leaving,

a lawyer is free to solicit the former firm's clients to the same extent that
any other lawyer could do so.377

In Cohen v. Rogers,378 the court of appeals affirmed a trial court award
of over $198,000 in sanctions against an attorney under section
9-15-14(b) 379 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.).380 The
majority opinion applied an abuse of discretion standard and held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that
sanctionable conduct occurred in connection with the filing of a second,
duplicative lawsuit in Fulton County concerning the same facts that

371. Id. at 148-49, 794 S.E.2d at 156-57.
372. 338 Ga. App. 25, 789 S.E.2d 265 (2016).
373. Id. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 267.
374. Id. at 26-30, 789 S.E.2d at 268-70.
375. Id. at 29, 789 S.E.2d at 270.
376. Id. at 27-28, 789 S.E.2d at 269.
377. Id. The court also noted that its decision was consistent with State Bar Formal
Advisory Opinion 97-3, which states in relevant part:
The departing attorney may also owe certain duties to the firm which may
require that the departing attorney should advise the firm of the attorney's
intention to leave the firm and the attorney's intention to notify clients of his or
her impending departure, prior to informing the clients of the situation.
Specifically, the departing attorney should not engage in professional conduct
which involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation" with
respect to the attorney's dealings with the firm as set forth in Standard 4.
Supreme Court of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op. 97 (Sept. 4, 1998), https://www.gabar.org/
barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=5 11); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAWS,
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 9(3) (Am. Law. Inst. 2000).
378. 341 Ga. 146, 798 S.E.2d 701 (2017).
379. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2016).
380. Cohen, 341 Ga. at 146-47, 798 S.E.2d at 703.
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underlay a pending case in Cobb County.381 The court further held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the amount of the award. 382
Judges Barnes and McFadden dissented. 383
VIII. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS

The State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion Board took
significant action with respect to three opinions in the survey year. 384
Formal Advisory Opinion Request 15-R1 385 asked whether a solo
practitioner's use of the words "firm" or "group" violates the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct.38 6 The Board's response, as embodied in
Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3, was: "A sole practitioner may not use
a firm name that includes 'group' or '& Associates' because both terms
would incorrectly imply that the sole practitioner practices with other
lawyers. However, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes
'firm."' 38 7 The opinion was published twice in the GeorgiaBar Journal 388
and was filed with the supreme court in November 2016.389 No one
requested the court to review the opinion, and the court did not review
the opinion on its own motion. 390 The opinion, therefore, binds the
requestor and the State Bar of Georgia but is only persuasive authority

otherwise. 391
Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1 (a redrafted version of FAO No.
03-2) concerns whether the duty of confidentiality under Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6 applies between two jointly represented
clients. 392 The Board's summary answer was:

The obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality
of Information, applies as between two jointly represented clients. An
attorney must honor one client's request that information be kept

381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 146-54, 798 S.E.2d at 703-07.
Id. at 154, 798 S.E.2d at 707.
Id. (Barnes, J. & McFadden, J., dissenting).
The Formal Advisory Opinion Board also declined several requests for opinions

during the survey year. For details, see the 2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL

COUNSEL, supra note 2, at 10-12.
385.

2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 2, at 11-12.

386. Id.
387. State Bar of Georgia, Proposed Redrafted Formal Advisory Opinion No. 15-R1, 22
GA. B.J. 91 (Aug. 2016).
388. See id.
389.

2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 2, at 12.

390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 13.
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confidential from the other jointly represented client. Honoring the
client's request will, in almost all circumstances, require the attorney
to withdraw from the joint representation. 393
The opinion appeared twice in the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed
with the supreme court in July 2016.394 No timely request was filed for
the court to review the opinion, and the court declined to review the
opinion on its own motion. 395 The opinion, therefore, binds only the
requestor and the State Bar of Georgia and is persuasive authority
otherwise. 396
Finally, Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-2 (a redrafted version of FAO
No. 10-2) deals with whether an attorney who has been appointed to
serve as both legal counsel and guardian ad litem for a child in a parental
rights case may advocate for termination of parental rights over the
child's objections. 397 The summary answer of the Board was: "When it
becomes clear that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the child's
wishes and the attorney's considered opinion of the child's best interests,
the attorney must withdraw from his or her role as the child's guardian
ad litem." 39 8 The opinion was published twice in the GeorgiaBar Journal
and reached the supreme court in November 2016.399 The State Bar of
Georgia filed a petition for discretionary review, and the matter is still
pending in the supreme court. 400
IX. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Georgia Supreme Court approved three significant amendments
to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct during the survey period.
Rule 1.7401 was amended to deal with the problem of part-time
prosecutors. 402 Many rural counties use part-time prosecutors to avoid
the expense of a full-time prosecutor. 403 Under the prior version of
Rule 1.7, the part-time prosecutor arguably had a conflict of interest that

393. State Bar of Georgia, Second Publication of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1, 22
GA. B.J. 91 (2016).
394.

2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 2, at 13.

395.

Id.

396. Id.
397. Id.

398.

State Bar of Georgia, Proposed Redrafted Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-2, 21

GA. B.J. 73 (2016).
399. 2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 2, at 13.
400. Id.
401. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7.
402. 2017 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 2, at 17.

403. Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. 393, 396, 330 S.E.2d 348, 351 (1985).
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would prevent the prosecutor from representing criminal defendants,
even in another part of the state. 404 For example, if you assume that the
prosecutor's client is the State of Georgia, then the prosecutor is in an
attorney-client relationship with the State, and the lawyer could not
represent a defendant being prosecuted by the State, without consent,
because the lawyer would be representing a client (the defendant)
against a current client (the State). 405 Rural counties likely would have a
hard time recruiting part-time prosecutors if that job disqualified the
lawyer (and all associated lawyers) from criminal defense cases. 406
Rule 1.7(d) was added to Rule 1.7:
(d) Though otherwise subject to the provisions of this Rule, a part-time
prosecutor who engages in the private practice of law may represent a
private client adverse to the state or other political subdivision that
the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, except with regard to
matters for which the part-time prosecutor had or has prosecutorial
authority or responsibility. 407
Comment 4 was amended to eliminate the "automatic" conflict that
kept a part-time prosecutor from representing criminal defense clients:
[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to that client without that client's
informed consent. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate
against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if
it is wholly unrelated. Paragraph (d) states an exception to that
general rule. A part-time prosecutor does not automatically have a
conflict of interest in representing a private client who is adverse to
the state or other political subdivision (such as a city or county) that
the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, although it is possible
that in a particular case, the part-time prosecutor could have a conflict
408
of interest under paragraph (a).

404. GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7,

comment 4 (commenting

"a lawyer ordinarily

may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even
if it is wholly unrelated.").
405. Id.
406. Thompson, 254 Ga. at 396, 330 S.E.2d at 351.
407. Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia at 4-5, 2017-1 Motion to Amend the Rules
and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (June
15, 2017) [hereinafter Order] https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism
/upload /Supreme-Court-Orders.pdf.
408. Id. at 6.

2017]

LEGAL ETHICS

203

Together, these changes are intended to solve the practical problem
that rural counties need to be able to recruit and retain high quality parttime prosecutors.
Rule 4.4(b)409 was added to bring some clarity to the responsibilities of

a lawyer who receives a document inadvertently: "(b) A lawyer who
receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the
representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should
know that the document or electronically stored information was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender." 410 Comment 2 to
Rule 4.4 was added to provide some relevant definitions and to make it
clear that the rule is not intended to answer three other questions:
whether other law might require the return of the document, whether
the inadvertent production waives privilege, and whether the lawyer has
additional duties if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
document came from someone who obtained it inappropriately.411
Finally, Georgia historically has severely restricted what a disbarred
or suspended lawyer may do in the service of a duly licensed attorney.
Rule 5.3 was amended to loosen those restrictions somewhat while at the
same time protecting the public from the disbarred or suspended
lawyer.41 2 Rule 5.3(d) now provides:
(d) a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or
disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice
of law is conducted by the lawyer to:
(1) represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar
status; or
(2) provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person,
by telephone or in writing. 413
As Comment 3 to the rule explains, this rule is intended to guard
against the unauthorized practice of law by a disbarred or suspended
lawyer.414

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4.
Order, supra note 407, at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Order, supra note 407, at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
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X. CONCLUSION

This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia legal ethics from
June 1, 2016 through May 31, 2017. For updates on developments after
that date, you may visit the web site of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics
41
and Professionalism.

5

415. As a service to the Georgia bench and bar, the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism provides monthly updates and other resources on recent developments in
Georgia legal ethics. Visit Recent Developments in Georgia Legal Ethics, Mercer Center for
Legal Ethics, http://law.mercer.edu/academics/centers/clep/updates-legal-ethics/.

